A Note on a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market with Possibly Bounded Salaries

Rashid Farooq and Ayesha Mahmood
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Rashid Farooq: School of Natural Sciences, National University of Sciences and Technology, H-12 Islamabad, Pakistan
Ayesha Mahmood: School of Natural Sciences, National University of Sciences and Technology, H-12 Islamabad, Pakistan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2017, vol. 19, issue 03, 1-21

Abstract: This paper deals with a many-to-many matching model with discrete-concave value functions and possibly bounded salaries. We extend the model of Fujishige and Tamura [(2007) Math. Oper. Res. 32, 136–155] by generalizing the payoff functions. We introduce weighted income and payments. To find a pairwise strictly stable outcome in our model, we propose an algorithm. We give a new method to modify salary vector in each iteration of the algorithm.

Keywords: Stable matching; marriage model; assignment model; discrete convex analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198917500177

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