Games with Symmetric Incomplete Information and Asymmetric Computational Resources

Misha Gavrilovich and Victoria Kreps
Additional contact information
Misha Gavrilovich: National Research University Higher School of Economics, 3 Kantemirovskaya st., St. Petersburg, Russia2St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics, RAS, 38 Serpuhovskaya st., St. Petersburg, Russia
Victoria Kreps: National Research University Higher School of Economics, 3 Kantemirovskaya st., St. Petersburg, Russia2St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics, RAS, 38 Serpuhovskaya st., St. Petersburg, Russia

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2018, vol. 20, issue 02, 1-16

Abstract: We consider random public signals on the state of two-person zero-sum game with incomplete information on both sides (both players do not know the state of the game). To learn the state, each player chooses a finite automaton which receives the public signal; the player only sees the output of the automaton chosen. Supposing that the size of automata available to Player 1 is essentially bigger than that available to Player 2, we give an example of public signal with random length of output strings where the posterior belief of Player 1 is the state and the posterior belief of Player 2 is close to his original belief. Thus, we demonstrate that asymmetric information about the state of a game may appear not only due to a private signal but as a result of a public signal and asymmetric computational resources of players.Besides, for a class of random signals with fixed length of output strings, we estimate the fraction of signals such that some automaton of given size may help Player 2 to significantly reestimate prior probability of the state. We show that this fraction is negligible if the size of automata of Player 2 is sufficiently smaller than length of output strings.

Keywords: Zero-sum game; incomplete information; asymmetry; finite automata; posterior belief (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198917500347
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:20:y:2018:i:02:n:s0219198917500347

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198917500347

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().