CO-EVOLUTION OF OPINION AND STRATEGY IN PERSUASION DYNAMICS: AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH

Fei Ding (), Yun Liu () and Yong Li ()
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Fei Ding: School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, P. R. China;
Yun Liu: School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, P. R. China;
Yong Li: School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, P. R. China;

International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), 2009, vol. 20, issue 03, 479-490

Abstract: In this paper, a new model of opinion formation within the framework of evolutionary game theory is presented. The model simulates strategic situations when people are in opinion discussion. Heterogeneous agents adjust their behaviors to the environment during discussions, and their interacting strategies evolve together with opinions. In the proposed game, we take into account payoff discount to join a discussion, and the situation that people might drop out of an unpromising game. Analytical and emulational results show that evolution of opinion and strategy always tend to converge, with utility threshold, memory length, and decision uncertainty parameters influencing the convergence time. The model displays different dynamical regimes when we set differently the rule when people are at a loss in strategy.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; opinion dynamics; strategy dynamics; 02.50.Ey; 05.45.-a; 89.65.-s; 89.75.-k (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0129183109013728

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