AGE-RELATED PREFERENTIAL SELECTION CAN PROMOTE COOPERATION IN THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

Zhen Wang (), Zhen Wang (), Yuan-Han Yang, Ming-Xing Yu and Li-Guo Liao
Additional contact information
Zhen Wang: School of Innovation Experiment, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China;
Zhen Wang: Department of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong;
Yuan-Han Yang: School of Innovation Experiment, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China
Ming-Xing Yu: School of Innovation Experiment, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China
Li-Guo Liao: School of Innovation Experiment, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China

International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), 2012, vol. 23, issue 02, 1-11

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce an age-related preferential selection mechanism into the prisoner's dilemma game. Under this mechanism, players can select a source of strategy imitation from their neighbors in a biased way proportional to their ages. Tuned by a selection parameter α, the impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation can be very different. The numerical results show that the cooperation will be effectively promoted by adjusting the value of α. By examining the evolution process and spatial patterns for different values of α, it is found that larger α will effectively promote the formation of large scale of cooperator clusters. In addition, the impact of noiseKon the spreading process of cooperation strategy is studied. We find that smallKcan make cooperation monotonously increase with α, while largeKguarantees the optimal existence of cooperation for an intermediate α.

Keywords: Prisoner's dilemma game; preferential selection; age; cooperation; 11.25.Hf; 123.1K (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0129183112500131
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:ijmpcx:v:23:y:2012:i:02:n:s0129183112500131

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0129183112500131

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC) is currently edited by H. J. Herrmann

More articles in International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().