How punishment and memory mechanism affect cooperative emergence in prisoner’s dilemma game

Jie Lu, Peipei Zhang and Dandan Li
Additional contact information
Jie Lu: School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 212013, P. R. China
Peipei Zhang: #x2020;School of Physics and Electronic Engineering, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 212013, P. R. China
Dandan Li: School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 212013, P. R. China

International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), 2021, vol. 32, issue 10, 1-12

Abstract: To remember or forget our acquaintances’ strategies can influence our decision-making significantly. In this paper, we explore the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game model with punishment and memory mechanism in the time-varying network. Our results show that a larger temptation gain T or a larger the number of connected edges of activated individuals m would result in the decrease of the final fraction of cooperators. However, with the increase of the maximum penalty cost, the maximum punishment intensity or the value of individual’s “memory factor”, players are more inclined to choose cooperative strategy. In addition, an effective way to promote the cooperation is to improve the social subsidy. Remarkably, only when the social subsidy is greater than the temptation gain, the density of cooperators could increase significantly. Interestingly, there is a linear relationship between the threshold of social subsidy and the temptation gain. The final results show that ones’ activity rates have no significant correlation with their strategies.

Keywords: Prisoner’s dilemma game; punishment; memory mechanism; time-varying network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0129183121501394
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:ijmpcx:v:32:y:2021:i:10:n:s0129183121501394

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0129183121501394

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC) is currently edited by H. J. Herrmann

More articles in International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().