The design of licensing contracts: Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and Electrical Engineering in Imperial Germany

Carsten Burhop and Thorsten Luebbers
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Carsten Burhop: University of Cologne
Thorsten Luebbers: MPI for Collective Goods Bonn

No 11, Cologne Economic History papers from University of Cologne, Department of Economic and Business History

Abstract: We investigate a sample of 180 technology licensing contracts closed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering companies between 1880 and 1913. Our empirical results suggest that strategic behaviour seems to be relevant for the design of licensing contracts, whereas inventor moral hazard and risk aversion of licensor or licensee seem to be irrelevant. Moreover, our results suggest that uncertainty regarding the profitability of licensed technology influenced the design of licensing contracts. More specifically, profit sharing agreements or producer milestones were typically included into licensing contracts.

Keywords: Economic History; Germany; pre-1913; Licensing contracts; Technology transfer. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 N83 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2011-06, Revised 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Published in Cologne Economic History Paper, 2011

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