Unions’ Bargaining Coordination in Multinational Enterprises

Domenico Buccella

No 61, FIW Working Paper series from FIW

Abstract: This paper investigates the coordination of bargaining activities among labor unions in a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) with plants in different countries. Making use of a threestage game where the parties sequentially decide whether o coordinate negotiations, it derives the bargaining regimes arising as sub-game perfect equilibria. In presence of workers perfect substitutes in production and symmetry in the plants’ efficiency, it is shown that unions’ transaction costs may attenuate the conflict of interests among the parties as regards the level of coordination at which negotiations should take place.

Keywords: bargaining; Multinational Enterprises; labor unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D60 F23 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.fiw.ac.at/fileadmin/Documents/Publikati ... Buccella_updated.pdf full text (application/pdf)
none

Related works:
Journal Article: Unions’ bargaining coordination in multinational enterprises (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsr:wpaper:y:2011:i:061

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
FIW Project Office Austrian Institute of Economic Research Arsenal Objekt 20 A-1030 Vienna

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FIW Working Paper series from FIW
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().