Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal and Asymmetric Information

Hayley Chouinard ()

No 2006-6, Working Papers from School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University

Abstract: This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders’ value distributions. The equilibria for multiple bidders and a more general value distribution are also presented

Keywords: repeated auction; right of first refusal; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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