Competition for status acquisition in public good games

Felix Munoz-Garcia

No 2008-12, Working Papers from School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University

Abstract: This paper examines the role of status acquisition as a motive for giving in voluntary contri- butions to public goods. In particular, every donor's status is given by the difference between his contribution and that of the other donor. Specifically, I show that contributors give more than in standard models where status is not considered, and their donation is increasing in the value they assign to status. In addition, players'contributions are increasing in the value that their opponents assign to status, reflecting donors' intense competition to gain social status. Furthermore, I consider contributors'equilibrium strategies both in simultaneous and sequen- tial contribution mechanisms. Then, I compare total contributions in both of these mechanisms. I find that the simultaneous contribution order generates higher total contributions than the sequential mechanism only when donors are sufficiently homogeneous in the value they assign to status. Otherwise, the sequential mechanism generates the highest contributions. Updated 6-03-09.

Keywords: Public goods games; Status acquisition; Competition. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2008-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Competition for status acquisition in public good games (2011)
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