Quality Uncertainty as Resolution of the Bertrand Paradox

Attila Tasnádi, Trenton Smith () and Andrew Hanks

No 2010-1, Working Papers from School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University

Abstract: We show that in a homogeneous-good duopoly market with quality uncertainty and constant unit costs, the Bertrand paradox (i.e., marginal cost pricing) can be avoided.

Keywords: oligopoly; endogenous preferences; threshold utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-mic and nep-mkt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Quality Uncertainty as Resolution of the Bertrand Paradox (2012)
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