Contract Duration and the Division of Labor in Agricultural Land Leases

Jonathan Yoder (), Ishrat Hossain, Francis Epplin () and Damona Doye ()

No 2005-5, Working Papers from School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University

Abstract: This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders’ value distributions. The equilibria for multiple bidders and a more general value distribution are also presented

Keywords: repeated auction; land lease contracts, moral hazard, contract duration, division of labor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J43 L23 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2005-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://129.3.20.41/eps/othr/papers/0506/0506011.pdf First version, 2005 (application/pdf)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Contract duration and the division of labor in agricultural land leases (2008)
Working Paper: Contract Duration and the Division of Labor in Agricultural Land Leases (2005)
Working Paper: Contract Duration and the Division of Labor in Agricultural Land Leases (2005)
Working Paper: Contract Duration and the Division of Labor in Agricultural Land Leases (2005)
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