Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank

Honorata Sosnowska (honorata@sgh.waw.pl)

Operations Research and Decisions, 2013, vol. 23, issue 1, 75-86

Abstract: Game theoreticians usually deal with standard voting methods such as plurality voting or approval voting. In reality however, some complicated non-standard voting methods are used. In this paper the voting method and rotation scheme have been presented used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. We present game theoretical approaches for analyzing this method and different methods of computing the Shapley value for games connected with voting under such rotation schemes.

Keywords: voting; European Central Bank; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wut:journl:v:1:y:2013:p:75-86:id:1054

DOI: 10.5277/ord130106

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