The Political Economy of the Essential Air Service Program

Joshua Hall, Amanda Ross () and Christopher Yencha

No 15-18, Working Papers from Department of Economics, West Virginia University

Abstract: We find that congressional influences affect the amount of airport subsidies that a congressional district receives from the Essential Air Service (EAS) program. The EAS program was passed with the goal of helping to continue commercial air service to rural communities following the deregulation of the airline industry. Using subsidy data from 1998-2014, we find strong evidence that subsidies are higher in districts having congressional representation on the House Transportation Committee. Representation on the House Appropriations Committee is also associated with higher subsidies. Our empirical results, combined with news reports, are consistent with the EAS serving private as well as public interests.

Keywords: congressional dominance; deregulation; airports (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-tre
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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