Political extremism in the presence of a free rider problem

Elie Appelbaum and Eliakim Katz

Working Papers from York University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides an explanation for the emergence of political extremism in an environment in which a change in “ré gime” requires an investment that benefits more than one player. We show that in order to mitigate the effects of free riding, players may choose extreme positions. Further, we show that as the free rider problem becomes more severe, both parties move to more extreme positions in the same direction.

Keywords: Political extremism; Free rider; Régime change; Sequential game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D71 D72 D74 F5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political extremism in the presence of a free rider problem (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yca:wpaper:2005_3

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