Wages, Fringe Benefits and Efficiency in Union-Firm Bargaining

Elie Appelbaum

Working Papers from York University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides an efficient union-firm bargaining solution within the right to manage framework, by separating efficiency and distribution considerations through bargaining over wage and fringe benefits. We show that without insurance considerations, efficiency is achieved by equating the wage and workers’ opportunity cost and providing the union with a surplus share in accordance with its bargaining power. We also show that with insurance considerations, the optimal contract, again, equates the wage and workers’ opportunity cost, but it also provides full insurance. There is empirical evidence that fringe benefits are, indeed, common and play an important role in union contracts.

Keywords: Price Union Contracts; Efficient Bargaining; Right to Manage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2008-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/research/workingPapers/w ... /2008/labour-bar.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yca:wpaper:2008_04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from York University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Support ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).