 ON THE SELF-(IN) STABILITY OF WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULESYaron Azrieli and
Semin Kim
No 2016rwp-95, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute Abstract: A voting rule f is self-stable (Barber`a and Jackson [4]) if any alternative rule g does not have sufficient support in the society to replace f, where the decision between f and g is based on the rule f itself. While Barber`a and Jackson focused on anonymous rules in which all agents have the same voting power, we consider here the larger class of weighted majority rules. Our main result is a characterization of self-stability in this setup, which shows that only few rules of a very particular form satisfy this criterion. This result provides a possible explanation for the tendency of societies to use more conservative rules when it comes to changing the voting rule. We discuss self-stability in this latter case, where a different rule F may be used to decide between f and g. Keywords: Voting rules; weighted majority rules; self-stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yon:wpaper:2016rwp-95 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute Contact information at EDIRC. |
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