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Unanimity and Local Incentive Compatibility

Miho Hong and Semin Kim
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Miho Hong: Yonsei University
Semin Kim: Yonsei University

No 2018rwp-138, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute

Abstract: We study the relationship between unanimity and local incentive constraints of deterministic social choice functions (or voting mechanisms) . We consider a standard Bayesian environment where agents have private and strict preference orderings on a finite set of alternatives. We show that with independent and generic priors, locally ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility of a social choice function combined with unanimity implies the tops-only property. Also, assuming unanimity invokes the sufficiency of local incentive constraints for full incentive constraints. Furthermore, unanimity helps our results hold in a broad class of domains | a few of its constituents being the unrestricted domain, the single-peaked domain, the single-dipped domain and some other connected domains.

Keywords: Unanimity; Incentive compatibility; Local incentive compatibility; Tops-only property; Connected domains (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 D02 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13pages
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yon:wpaper:2018rwp-138

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