Stable Constitutions

Daeyoung Jeong and Semin Kim
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Daeyoung Jeong: New York University Abu Dhabi
Semin Kim: Yonsei University

No 2018rwp-139, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute

Abstract: This study identifies a set of stable constitutions. A constitution is a pair of voting rules (f, F) where f is for the choice of final outcome, and F is for the decision on the change of a voting rule from the given rule f. A constitution is stable if any possible alternative rule does not get enough votes to replace the given rule f under the rule F. We fully characterize the set of interim stable constitutions among anonymous voting rules. We also characterize the properties of the interim stable constitutions among general weighted majority rules.

Keywords: Weighted majority rules; decision rules; self-stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46pages
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yon:wpaper:2018rwp-139

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