The Effects of "Observability" on Rejection Behavior in Ultimatum Game Experiments

Miho Hong, Chulyoung Kim, Sang-Hyun Kim and Sangyoon Nam
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Miho Hong: Yale Univ
Sangyoon Nam: U of Southern California

No 2019rwp-155, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute

Abstract: Using a modified ultimatum game experiment, we tested the hypothesis that greater “observability†of responders’ actions leads to a higher rejection rate. Our experimental data on participants’ rejection behavior rejected this hypothesis but confirmed the theory of reference-dependent preferences.

Keywords: Ultimatum game experiment; audience effect; signaling; loss aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7pages
Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yon:wpaper:2019rwp-155

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