Power to Ignore: Locally Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility

Miho Hong and Semin Kim
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Miho Hong: Yale Univ
Semin Kim: Yonsei Univ

No 2020rwp-170, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute

Abstract: We investigate the locally ordinal notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility (LOBIC) of deterministic voting mechanisms. We consider a standard Bayesian environment where agents have private and strict preference orderings on a finite set of alternatives. Our main domains of preferences over alternatives are even larger than a broad class of domains — a few of its constituents being the unrestricted domain, the single-peaked domain, and the single-dipped domain. With independent and generic priors, we show that LOBIC of a mechanism combined with unanimity implies the tops-only property. Furthermore, we find a subclass of the domains where a mechanism with LOBIC and unanimity is dictatorial. We study the sufficiency of local incentive constraints for full incentive constraints and the relationship between LOBIC and dominant strategy incentive compatibility.

Keywords: Incentive compatibility; Local incentive compatibility; Tops-only property; Dictatorship; Connected domains; Unanimity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 D02 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18pages
Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-ore
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