On the (Robust) Ex-post Stability of Constitutions

Semin Kim
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Semin Kim: Yonsei University

No 2023rwp-212, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute

Abstract: Barbera and Jackson (2004) define a constitution as a pair of voting rules (f, F), where f is employed for ordinary decisions, and F is employed to choose between f and a proposed voting rule. While they study the stability of constitutions at the ex-ante stage, where agents’ preferences over final outcomes are uncertain, we focus on the ex-post stage, where agents’ preferences are known. We present a characterization of ex-post stable constitutions. Furthermore, we examine the robustness of this characterization to the changes in the voting environment and the relationship between ex-post stability and ex-ante stability of constitutions.

Keywords: Constitutions; Ex-post stability; Voting rules. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11pages
Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
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