The Tenure Game: Building Up Academic Habits

João Ricardo Faria and Gonçalo Monteiro

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: Why do some academics continue to be productive after receiving tenure? This paper answers this question by using a Stackelberg differential game between departments and scholars. We show that departments can set tenure rules and standards as incentives for scholars to accumulate academic habits. As a result, academic habits have a lasting positive impact in scholar’s productivity, leading to higher scholar’s productivity rate of growth and higher productivity level.

Keywords: Role of economists; sociology of economics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A11 A14 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sog
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