On Redistributive Taxation under the Threat of High-Skill Emigration

Alan Krause

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: The increasing international mobility of high-skill individuals is often seen as posing a threat to domestic social welfare, by limiting the ability of governments to tax these individuals and redistribute to the poor. In this note, we examine a simple dynamic nonlinear income tax model without commitment. In this setting, it is shown that the threat of emigration by high-skill individuals facilitates redistribution and increases social welfare in the short run, and has no effect on social welfare over the long run.

Keywords: nonlinear taxation; migration; commitment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 H21 H24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-mig, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2015/1521.pdf Main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:15/21

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Hodgson ().