Reduced-Form Allocations for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints

Xu Lang and Zaifu Yang

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: We examine the implementation of reduced-form allocation rules that assign multiple indivisible objects to many agents, with incomplete information and distributional constraints across objects and agents. To obtain implementability results, we adopt a lift-and-project approach, which reduces the problem to a problem of enumerating finite generators of a projection cone. We study geometric and combinatorial properties of the projection cone and provide a total unimodularity condition that leads to several characterization results including those on hierarchies and bihierarchies. Our results have applications in matching markets with constraints where agents may have ordinal or cardinal preferences.

Keywords: Implementation; Reduced-form rules; Indivisible goods; Distributional constraints; Total unimodularity; Incomplete information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:21/04

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