Disentangling fiscal effects of local constitutions

Jarosław Kantorowicz and Monika Köppl-Turyna

No 6, Working Papers from Agenda Austria

Abstract: We apply the difference-in-discontinuities design to disentangle the fiscal effects of the governance system conditional on electoral systems. We take advantage of a natural experiment, which involves two institutional reforms at the local level in Poland. The first reform introduced two electoral rules, which change along an exogenous population threshold: smaller municipalities use majoritarian elections, larger municipalities use proportional elections. The second reform changed the governance system in Polish municipalities from “parliamentary” to “presidential”. Our results indicate that a change from parliamentary to presidential form led to lower vertical fiscal imbalance predominantly in the jurisdictions with majoritarian elections and to a lesser extent in municipalities governed by proportional elections. This therefore confirms an interaction effect between the forms of government and electoral rules.

Keywords: electoral rules; vertical fiscal imbalance; constitutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eur, nep-pol and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/163563/1/agenda-austria-wp-06.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Disentangling the fiscal effects of local constitutions (2019)
Working Paper: Disentangling fiscal effects of local constitutions (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:agawps:06

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