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Toward an understanding of collaborative tax evasion: A natural field experiment with businesses

Annabelle Doerr and Sarah Necker

No 18/13, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics from Walter Eucken Institut e.V.

Abstract: Sales from businesses to consumers provide fertile ground for collaborative tax evasion. However, little is known about the phenomenon. We conduct a natural field experiment with 2,900 businesses in which we take the role of consumers and vary if we request an invoice for the delivery of a service. We find that 56% of businesses approach consumers with the intention to evade. The fraction is zero in the regulated market and 72% in the unregulated market. It increases when consumers signal their willingness to collude. Consumers can save 25% of the legal price on average if they agree to evade.

Keywords: collaborative tax evasion; evasion rent; field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 E26 H26 J22 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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