Standing on the shoulders of giants or science? Lessons from ordoliberalism

Lars Feld and Ekkehard Köhler

No 23/2, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics from Walter Eucken Institut e.V.

Abstract: James Buchanan would have celebrated his 100th birthday in 2019. This serves as an inspiration to look at the future of public choice and the question of how much normativity public choice can bear. In our analysis we draw parallels between public choice and German ordoliberalism (and its source in the Freiburg School of Economics). We argue that the reception of ordoliberalism exemplifies easy-to-grasp pitfalls that should be taken seriously. We anchor the future agenda of public choice in a solid individualist perspective. Similar to ordoliberalism, public choice will have to clarify its relation to normative economics. The effects of rules and institutions and their working properties should be thoroughly analyzed empirically. The role of ideas is important for the normative foundation of both public choice/ constitutional economics and ordoliberalism, and is rooted in normative individualism. It provides a benchmark by which rules and institutions can be judged as favorable.

Keywords: Public Choice; Methodology; James Buchanan; Normativity; Individualism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B13 B26 B31 D78 E61 E63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-hpe and nep-inv
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Standing on the shoulders of giants or science? Lessons from ordoliberalism (2023)
Working Paper: Standing on the Shoulders of Giants or Science? – Lessons from Ordoliberalism (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:aluord:2302

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