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Polycentric governance in collusive agreements

Wolfgang Schmal

No 24/1, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics from Walter Eucken Institut e.V.

Abstract: Collusive agreements in the form of cartels among firms are complex structures. The involved firms need to agree on prices and sales quotas that are legally not enforceable. Market characteristics that foster cartels' failure or success are widely examined. However, the interplay between the involved firms in a collusive agreement, i.e., the governance dimension within a cartel, has received surprisingly low attention. Using a comprehensive dataset of 191 cartels from 2012 - 2018, this paper empirically reveals that polycentric structures within the cartel governance may contribute to longer duration and lower sanctions imposed by competition authorities, especially for large cartels. By that, the paper sheds new light on two aspects: The entangled governance structures of collusive undertakings as well as the relevance of polycentricity in the firm environment. The insights may be helpful for cartel authorities and new research combining institutional and industrial economics.

Keywords: Collusion; illegal cartels; polycentricity; governance; institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 D02 D23 K42 L40 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law and nep-reg
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