Self-serving bias and tax morale

Kay Blaufus, Matthias Braune, Jochen Hundsdoerfer and Martin Jacob

No 174, arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research from arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre

Abstract: In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection probability does not affect this result. Further, we do not find moral spillover effects, for example, on legal activities.

Keywords: Evasion; Tax Morale; Tax Compliance; Self-Serving Bias; Moral Spillover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-iue and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:arqudp:174

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