Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests

Christoph March and Marco Sahm

No 117, BERG Working Paper Series from Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group

Abstract: We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion.

Keywords: Asymmetric Contest; Discouragement Effect; Disappointment Aversion; Laboratory Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests (2017)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Discouragement in Asymmetric Contests (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bamber:117

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