Deciding to peg the exchange rate in developing countries: the role of private-sector debt

Philipp Harms and Mathias Hoffmann ()

No 2009,34, Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies from Deutsche Bundesbank

Abstract: We argue that a higher share of the private sector in a country's external debt raises the incentive to stabilize the exchange rate. We present a simple model in which exchange rate volatility does not affect agents' welfare if all the debt is incurred by the government. Once we introduce private banks who borrow in foreign currency and lend to domestic firms, the monetary authority has an incentive to dampen the distributional consequences of exchange rate fluctuations. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that not only the level, but also the composition of foreign debt matters for exchange-rate policy.

Keywords: Exchange rate regimes; foreign debt; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 F31 F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-ifn, nep-mac and nep-mon
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/29653/1/61591957X.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Deciding to Peg the Exchange Rate in Developing Countries: The Role of Private-Sector Debt (2011)
Working Paper: Deciding to Peg the Exchange Rate in Developing Countries:The Role of Private-Sector Debt (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:200934

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