Bank liquidity creation and risk taking during distress

Allen N. Berger, Christa Bouwman, Thomas Kick and Klaus Schaeck

No 2010,05, Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies from Deutsche Bundesbank

Abstract: Liquidity creation is one of banks' raisons d'être. But what happens to liquidity creation and risk taking when a bank is identified as distressed by regulatory bodies and subjected to regulatory interventions and/or receives capital injections? What are the long-run effects of such interventions? To address these questions, we exploit a unique dataset of German universal banks for the period 1999 - 2008. Our main findings are as follows. First, regulatory interventions and capital injections are followed by lower levels of liquidity creation. The probability of a decline in liquidity creation increases to up to around 50 percent when such actions are taken. Second, bank risk taking decreases in the aftermath of regulatory interventions and capital injections. Third, while banks' liquidity creation market shares decline over the five years following such disciplinary measures, they also reduce their risk exposure over this period to become safer banks.

Keywords: Liquidity creation; bank distress; regulatory interventions; capital injections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-fmk and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/39790/1/634479857.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bubdp2:201005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies from Deutsche Bundesbank Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().