Multinational banks' deleveraging in the crisis driven by pre-crisis characteristics and behavior
Rainer Frey
No 18/2015, Discussion Papers from Deutsche Bundesbank
Abstract:
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a rapid and far-reaching shrinkage of international banks' assets with a focus on foreign claims took place. For the largest 67 German banking groups, we find that both their characteristics and behavior in the pre-crisis episode had repercussions for the crisis period. Above all, prior non-traditional banking activities - proxied by the relevance of securities and noninterest income - resulted in balance sheet contraction in the crisis. While, from 2002 to mid-2008, a disproportionately high growth rate in profits to assets is found to be indicative of too much risk taking, both high average income and a strong balance sheet expansion in the pre-crisis period are found to be positive per se. In contrast, a high average income or a strong growth in assets in just the last three and a half years before the outbreak of the crisis put balance sheets during the crisis under adjustment pressure. During the crisis, short-term wholesale funding proved to be a disadvantage, while good capital endowment (core Tier 1 capital to RWA ratio), deposit funding and strong affiliate presence abroad had a stabilizing impact. Most of these variables lose their significance in normal times.
Keywords: banks; deleveraging; foreign assets; financial crisis; pre crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 F34 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/112762/1/832193631.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bubdps:182015
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Papers from Deutsche Bundesbank Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().