EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Taxing banks: An evaluation of the German bank levy

Claudia Buch, Björn Hilberg and Lena Tonzer

No 38/2014, Discussion Papers from Deutsche Bundesbank

Abstract: Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system, the real economy, and for public finances. Regimes for the restructuring and resolution of banks, financed by bank levies and fiscal backstops, seek to reduce these costs. Bank levies attempt to internalize systemic risk and to increase the costs of leverage. This paper evaluates the effects of the German bank levy implemented in 2011 as part of the German Bank Restructuring Act. Our analysis offers three main insights. First, revenues raised through the bank levy are lower than expected, because of low tax rates and high thresholds for tax exemptions. Second, the bulk of the payments were contributed by large commercial banks and by the central institutions of savings banks and credit unions. Third, for the banks affected by the levy, we find evidence for a reduction in lending and higher deposit rates.

Keywords: bank levy; bank lending; interest rates; German banks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-cba
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/106176/1/81416188X.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Taxing banks: An evaluation of the German bank levy (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Taxing Banks: An Evaluation of the German Bank Levy (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bubdps:382014

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Deutsche Bundesbank Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:382014