Exclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets

Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt

No 2004-09, Economics Working Papers from Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts, whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised by prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes.

Keywords: exclusive dealing; common agency; international trade; competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/21985/1/EWP-2004-09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Exclusive dealing and common agency in international markets (2006)
Working Paper: Exclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cauewp:2440

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (econstor@zbw-workspace.eu).