Uncertainty and bargaining: A structural econometric approach

Gordon Klein and Mayra Rebolledo

No 114, CAWM Discussion Papers from University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP)

Abstract: This paper proposes a structural econometric model to analyze the influence of uncertain disagreement outcomes on the settlement of new agreements between parties with uneven bargaining power. By including the the findings of theoretical literature on the requirements to reach agreements under uncertain disagreement conditions, and using an asymmetric Nash bargaining framework, our proposal is able to estimate not only the bargaining solutions but also the bargainers' uncertainties and determine whether a new compromise could be reach under such uncertainty or not.

Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:114

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