High incentives without high cost: The role of (perceived) stake sizes in dictator games

Daniel Hopp

No 123, CAWM Discussion Papers from University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP)

Abstract: The external validity of dictator games conducted in a lab is often questioned due to the use of small stake sizes that do not correspond to real-world settings. A potential solution to this problem is based on how participant perceptions of stake sizes are affected by their numerical representation. In this paper, I vary the stake size and its numerical representation to examine whether the illusion of large stakes can be created convincingly by implementing inflated numbers through an experimental currency. The share allocated to the recipient does not differ across treatments in this large-sample online experiment. This finding demonstrates that neither an increase in stake size nor a change in its numerical representation influence the share allocated to the recipient in a dictator game.

Keywords: dictator game; stake size; numerosity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C99 D64 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:123

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