Competition and corporate control in partial ownership acquisitions

Torben Stühmeier
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Torben Stuehmeier

No 85, CAWM Discussion Papers from University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP)

Abstract: Competition authorities have a growing interest in assessing the effects of partial ownership arrangements. We show that the effects of such agreements on competition and welfare depend on the intensity of competition in the market and on the firms' governance structure. When assessing the effects of partial ownership, competition policy has to consider both the financial interest and level of control of the acquiring firm in the target firm.

Keywords: corporate control; merger; partial acquisition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-ind
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/128492/1/847454657.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Competition and Corporate Control in Partial Ownership Acquisitions (2016)
Working Paper: Competition and corporate control in partial ownership acquisitions (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:85

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