Buying votes and international organizations
Axel Dreher and
James Vreeland
No 123, University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Analyzing an original dataset on the successful and failed resolutions of the UNSC, we find evidence of vote-buying.
Keywords: IMF; UN Security Council; Voting; Aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F35 O11 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cegedp:123
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