The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life

Stephan Müller ()

No 219, University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper applies the indirect evolutionary approach to study the evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life. The game comprises a dilemma, a problem of coordination, and a problem of distribution as a general framework for the evolution of preferences. In singlegame environments, there emerges a global advantage for inequality-averse individuals in the dilemma and a global disadvantage for inequality-averse players who are favoured by the problem of distribution. The simplified game of life puts these strong predictions into perspective. In particular, selfish and inequality-averse individuals may coexist in the subpopulation, favoured in the problem of distribution.

Keywords: inequality aversion; evolution; preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cegedp:219

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