The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control

R. Emre Aytimur (), Aristotelis Boukouras and Robert Schwager

No 240, University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present a modified citizen-candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two-candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates´ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one-candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation.

Keywords: elections; polarization; strategic delegation; bureaucracy; foreign influence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/109039/1/821987836.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control (2015)
Working Paper: The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cegedp:240

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