Managerial multitasking in the mutual fund industry

Vikas Agarwal, Linlin Ma and Kevin Mullally

No 13-10 [rev.], CFR Working Papers from University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Abstract: We examine the determinants and consequences of mutual fund managers simultaneously managing multiple funds. Well-performing managers multitask by taking over poorly performing funds or launching new funds. Subsequent to multitasking, funds run by managers prior to multitasking (i.e., incumbent funds) experience performance deterioration while the performance of the acquired funds improves. Multitasking increases the assets of fund companies but results in a wealth transfer from shareholders of the incumbent funds to those of the funds the managers take over. Multitasking arrangements are terminated when investors recognize the associated agency problem and withdraw their capital from the incumbent funds.

Keywords: Multitasking; Fund Performance; Fund Flows; Agency Problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G20 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cfrwps:1310r

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