Firms’ rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation

Marc Goergen, Peter Limbach and Meik Scholz-Daneshgari

No 18-06, CFR Working Papers from University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Abstract: Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining (separating) the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous and comprise more words, including more positive words, for firms with duality. Examining the announcement returns to firms' disclosures, we find that investors evaluate the most frequently cited reasons for CEO duality by considering the firm's characteristics.

Keywords: CEO Duality; Board of Directors; Corporate Governance; Regulation S-K; Textual Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019, Revised 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cfn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/261100/1/cfr-18-06rev.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Firms' rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cfrwps:1806

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CFR Working Papers from University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().