High marginal tax rates on the top 1%?

Fabian Kindermann and Dirk Krueger

No 473, CFS Working Paper Series from Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Abstract: In this paper we argue that very high marginal labor income tax rates are an effective tool for social insurance even when households have preferences with high labor supply elasticity, make dynamic savings decisions, and policies have general equilibrium effects. To make this point we construct a large scale Overlapping Generations Model with uninsurable labor productivity risk, show that it has a wealth distribution that matches the data well, and then use it to characterize fiscal policies that achieve a desired degree of redistribution in society. We find that marginal tax rates on the top 1% of the earnings distribution of close to 90% are optimal. We document that this result is robust to plausible variation in the labor supply elasticity and holds regardless of whether social welfare is measured at the steady state only or includes transitional generations.

Keywords: Progressive Taxation; Top 1%; Social Insurance; Income Inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H21 H24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ias, nep-mac and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cfswop:473

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