Economic voting and economic revolutionizing? The economics of incumbency changes in European democracies and revolutionary events in the Arab World

Marie Möller

No 10/2011, CIW Discussion Papers from University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW)

Abstract: While people in democracies can vote their government out when they are discontent with its policies, those in dictatorships cannot do so. They can only attempt to expel the dictator via mass protests or revolutions. Based on a general cause-and-effect mechanism, the author analyzes whether such mass protests are more likely when the economic situation is poor and vote outs are more likely under bad economic conditions. The empirical analysis provides evidence of economic voting in the European democracies. On the other hand, the results for the Arab World show that economic revolutionizing does not occur there. For this reason, the economics of the Arab Spring are analyzed in greater detail. It can be concluded that bad policy is punished in democracies only. Therefore, by using positive analysis, the investigation demonstrates the malfunctioning of the political market in dictatorships.

Keywords: economic voting; revolutionary events; Arab Spring; political economy; political protest; degree of democracy; dictatorship; Revolution; Abwahl; Arabischer Frühling; Demokratie; Diktatur; Neue politische Ökonomie (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 P0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ciwdps:102011

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