Fiscal disparity, institutions and asymmetric yardstick competition

Alfa Farah

No 2/2018, CIW Discussion Papers from University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW)

Abstract: Fiscal disparity leads to a yardstick bias, in that incumbents in fiscally-rich jurisdictions can provide more public goods, extract more rents and yet have a higher probability to be reelected. This study further emphasizes disparity among jurisdictions, not only in terms of fiscal resources but also of costs of rent appropriation. In a setting in which jurisdictions with a higher fiscal capacity have lower costs of rent appropriation whilst those with a lower fiscal capacity have higher costs of rent appropriation, the difference in costs of rent appropriation might moderate the bias caused by the fiscal disparity.

Keywords: accountability; rent; fiscal capacity; institutions; yardstick competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H71 H72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-knm and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/179283/1/1023167417.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ciwdps:22018

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIW Discussion Papers from University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().