The first shall be last: serial position effects in the case contestants evaluate each other

Stefan D. Haigner, Stefan Jenewein, Hans Christian Müller and Florian Wakolbinger

No 14, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Abstract: We analyze competitions where the contestants evaluate each other and find the first contestant to be disadvantaged. We suspect that this is due to information diffusion, Bayesian belief updating taking place in course of the contest and initial uncertainty about a contestant's relative quality.

Keywords: Serial Position Effects; Ordering Effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:14

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