A note on consumer flexibility, data quality and collusion
Irina Hasnas
No 140, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Abstract:
In this note we analyze the sustainability of collusion in a game of repeated interaction where firms can price discriminate among consumers based on two types of customer data. This work is related to Liu and Serfes (2007) and Sapi and Suleymanova (2013). Following Sapi and Suleymanova we assume that consumers are differentiated both with respect to their addresses and transportation cost parameters (flexibility). While firms have perfect data on consumer addresses, data on their flexibility is imperfect. We use three collusive schemes to analyze the impact of the improvement in the quality of customer flexibility data on the incentives to collude. In contrast to Liu and Serfes in our model it is the customer flexibility data which is imperfect and not the data on consumer addresses. However, our results support their findings that with the improvement in data quality it is more difficult to sustain collusion.
Keywords: Price Discrimination; Customer Data; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L15 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/96149/1/783546564.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:140
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().