Raising rivals' costs through buyer power

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt (markus.dertwinkel-kalt@wiwi.uni-muenster.de), Justus Haucap and Christian Wey

No 162, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Abstract: We re-examine the view that a ban on price discrimination in input markets is particularly desirable in the presence of buyer power. This argument crucially depends on an inverse relationship between downstream firms' profits and the uniform input price. Assuming different input efficiencies among downstream firms, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition such that a higher input price benefits a subset of relatively efficient downstream firms. In such instances, consumers may be better off if discriminatory pricing is feasible.

Keywords: Price discrimination; Buyer Power; Raising Rivals’ Costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K31 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Raising rivals’ cost through buyer power (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:162

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