Proof beyond a reasonable doubt: Laboratory evidence

Florian Baumann and Tim Friehe

No 181, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Abstract: We investigate how third-party punishers and potential violators decide under evidentiary uncertainty in a take game. In line with the legal requirement and in contrast to economic models, neither the sanction nor the harm level affects the punishment probability, but the quality of evidence does have an impact. Potential violators' decisions are strongly influenced by the expected punishment probability but not by the level of the sanction.

Keywords: experiment; standard of proof; third-party punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D81 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:181

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